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Abstract: The paper examines the long run evolution of local bias by UK investors between the 
1870s and the 1930s. It uses a large sample of nearly 30,000 shareholders based on 197 sets of 
share records, a large and representative database of the investor population across sectors and 
time. It investigates the structure and the evolution of local investment preference between 
shareholders and the companies in which they invested, as measured by the distance between 
where they lived and corporate HQ. The study offers evidence of strong initial local 
investment preference, which declines over time for non-Londoners but remains strong 
for Londoners until the 1930s. Local investment preference of ordinary security holders 
was related to the size of the board of directors and, for wealthy investors, was related to 
the age of the firm. For large firms, local networks between investors and directors 
appear stronger when director shareholdings and voting rights were important. This 
study supports the analytical hypothesis of local informal trust networks between 
investors and directors as a means to overcome informational asymmetries and weak 
legal protection, and provides evidence that local preference was a means to curb insider 
opportunism and private benefits of control.  
Keywords: Local bias, investor trust, corporate governance, firm performance. 
JEL Classifications: N23, N24, G11. 
 
 
[Draft: August 2016; forthcoming in The Economic History Review] 
  
2 
 
This paper focuses on geographical investor dispersion and local investment bias in the UK, 
using data from a large sample of individual investors and covering a historical period of 
nearly seven decades between the 1870s and the 1930s. It aims to shed more light on this 
relatively under-researched theme in the history of share ownership. While local investment 
bias is a standard theme in contemporary financial studies,1 there is little comparable research 
in the context of UK economic history.2 
 From the second half of the nineteenth century, after the introduction of limited 
liability in 1856 (and its extension in 1862), the UK experienced a widening of participation 
in financial investment. A series of stylized facts have been highlighted in relevant 
discussions and debates, such as the developed character of UK stock exchanges, the rise of 
listed companies, the wide dispersion of shareholdings and the so-called gradual divorce of 
ownership from control. Hitherto, the majority of relevant research has focused on ownership 
concentration and control by insiders. This paper, by exploring the geographical distribution 
of shareholders as a whole in relation to firms’ headquarters, and not just large shareholders 
or directors, aims to fill this gap in the literature and to address the extent of local investment 
preference, changes over time and differences across firms, as well as possible explanations 
for these trends. 
 This study offers evidence of strong initial local investment preference, which 
declines over time. However, there is geographical variation: local preference remained 
strong for Londoners until the 1930s, whilst it gradually declined over the period for non-
Londoners. The geographical investment proximity, as measured by the distance between 
where investors lived and the firm’s registered office, can be viewed as a proxy for informal 
                                                          
1 Seasholes and Zhu, ‘Individual investors’; Petersen and Rajan, ‘Does distance matter’; Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, ‘Distance, language, and culture’. 
2 With the exception of Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. From our point of view, local investment bias is an 
interesting question in its own right but it is also related to the discussion with regard to the managerial 
revolution and could be addressed in the context of weak UK investor protection. 
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trust. Local investment preference of ordinary security holders was related to the size of the 
board of directors, and local preference of wealthy investors was related to the age of the 
firm. As explained below, both relations support the analytical hypothesis of local informal 
trust networks between investors and directors as a means to overcome informational 
asymmetries and weak legal protection. Additionally, for large firms, local networks between 
investors and directors appear stronger when the shareholdings and the voting rights of the 
latter were important. This is also evidence that local preference was a means to curb insider 
opportunism and private benefits of control. Investors also appear to be more sensitive to the 
risk of notionally safe investments (debentures), while the number of cross listings 
undermined local bias since investors could target locally-listed securities of distant firms. 
 
I 
 
One possible theoretical framework for the structural factors that influence financial 
development is the so-called Legal Origins Theory or ‘law matters’ thesis. The initial idea 
goes back to La Porta et al., who carried out a comparative study between countries with 
different legal origins with the perspective of the contractual view of the firm. They posited 
that ‘legal protection of outside investors limits the extent of expropriation of such investors 
by corporate insiders, and thereby promotes financial development’.3 There are basically two 
different theoretical insights underpinning this argument.4 First, in the face of informational 
asymmetries and monitoring costs, minority investors are willing to pay a higher price to buy 
corporate securities if formal legal protection from insiders is strong and reliable. Minority 
shareholders will be more confident in their investments and capital will flow more easily to 
                                                          
3 La Porta et al., ‘Law and finance’; idem. ‘Economic consequences’, p. 285. For a discussion of the theory of 
the firm, see Jensen and Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm’, and Hart, Firms. 
4 See La Porta et al., ‘Law and finance’, p. 1145; Mayer, ‘Trust in financial markets’, p. 620; Cheffins, ‘Does 
law matter’, p. 462; Coffee, ‘Do norms matter’, p. 2157. 
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firms. As a result, the historical outcome of legal protection of shareholders would be a larger 
number of listed firms and more valuable stock markets than would be the case without such 
legal protection. Second, large and dominant shareholders will need less capital to efficiently 
monitor managers and thus firms would be expected to have more diffuse ownership. In brief, 
given that there are private benefits of corporate control, strong legal protection can secure 
both blockholders against expropriation by managers and minority holders against 
expropriation by insiders. All in all, law definitely matters, heavily affecting the structure of 
the financial system. 
 A considerable number of studies have addressed the above ubiquitous argument, 
suggesting that the ‘law matters’ thesis cannot adequately describe the historical diversity of 
financial development across different countries. From this analytical viewpoint, there are 
functional substitutes for law that could be equally effective (if not more so) in protecting 
investors. For example, Rajan and Zingales have argued that some historical and cross-
country differences in financial development can be explained by the presence of incumbents 
who oppose financial development (and investor protection) because it breeds competition.5 
Mayer and Franks et al. have suggested that informal trust relations are as important in 
financial development as more formal legal arrangements.6 The role of social norms, 
financial self-regulatory institutions and culture have also been offered as critical factors for 
investor protection and as genuine substitutes for the law.7 In practice, financial reality can be 
quite complex ‘because legal rules may sometimes be embedded in a matrix of norms and 
conventional practices that all interact with and reinforce each other’.8  
                                                          
5 Rajan and Zingales, ‘Great reversal’. 
6 Mayer, ‘Trust in financial markets’; Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
7 Coffee, ‘Do norms matter’; Cheffins, Corporate ownership; Cheffins, 'Does law matter?'; and Stulz and 
Williamson, ‘Culture, openness, and finance’. 
8 Coffee, ‘Do norms matter’, p. 2156. 
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 The historical experience of the UK has cast additional doubt on the ‘law matters’ 
thesis. Despite the fact that the UK has been, and is, a common law country, a number of 
scholars in economic history share the idea that, at least until the second half of the twentieth 
century, the UK did not qualify as a protective jurisdiction for minority or outside investors.9 
Given the developed character of UK stock exchanges, the rise of listed companies, the wide 
dispersion of shareholdings, and the gradually decentralized pattern of share ownership at 
least from the late Victorian era, the ‘law matters’ thesis does not seem to offer an adequate 
explanation of UK financial developments. A number of follow-up studies have attempted to 
shed more light on this question. 
 Cheffins has argued that weak legal protection of outsiders was substituted by 
‘alternative institutional safeguards’ supporting demand for small minority holdings in public 
companies.10 Foreman-Peck and Hannah also stress the growing number of small scale 
passive shareholders in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain but, contrary to Cheffins, they 
argue that the ‘evolution of managerial control in the UK was substantially completed before 
1914’.11 Using a sample (of over 300 firms) of the largest UK public companies in 1911, 
Foreman-Peck and Hannah estimate that directors personally did not own more than 3.5 per 
cent of the shares, also arguing that a higher return on equity was used as a means of 
attracting a wider shareholding.12 Campbell and Turner also make a similar point. Based on a 
sample of 800 publicly traded companies in the early 1880s, they offer evidence that 
dividends and informal trust mechanisms played some role in protecting outside investors in 
an inadequate legal environment.13 Acheson et al., using data for 890 share records in the 
                                                          
9 Cheffins, ‘Does law matter?’; Campbell and Turner, ‘Corporate governance’; Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
10 Cheffins ‘Does law matter?’, p. 476. 
11 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Managerial revolution’, p. 2; idem., ‘Divorce of ownership from control’, p. 544; 
On the other hand, Cheffins argues that the so-called managerial revolution (separation of ownership from 
control) did not take place before the second half of the twentieth century in the UK. (Cheffins, Corporate 
ownership, p. 252). 
12 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Managerial revolution’; idem., ‘Divorce of ownership from control’. 
13 Campbell and Turner, ‘Corporate governance’. 
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second half of the nineteenth century, provide evidence that ownership was separated from 
control as early as the Victorian era.14 Franks et al., collecting data for UK firms in 1920 (53 
companies) and 1950 (56 companies) also argue that investor protection had little impact on 
dispersion of ownership.15 
 These findings run contrary to the ‘law matters’ thesis from a number of different 
perspectives. They mostly focus on the relationship between managers and individual 
blockholders or, less often, on the dispersion of ownership. From the above-mentioned 
literature only Franks et al. discuss the spatial diffusion of ordinary investors, stressing a 
rather extraordinary finding: for a sample of 26 companies in 1910 (with an average number 
of shareholders of 32016), the proportion of investors living within six miles of firms’ 
headquarters is 56 per cent.17 This result clearly indicates strong local biases in individual 
investor preferences, a phenomenon which (under different scale and terms) still appears in 
contemporary financial markets.18 For this contemporary research, ‘local’ investment is 
defined as shares ‘being headquartered near where an investor lives’.19 The assumption is that 
a firm's registered office, where directors' gatherings typically take place and where investors 
can access accounting and legal information relating to a firm's governance and performance, 
is a much better source of information for investors than the operating plants. 
 This paper focuses on geographical investor dispersion and local investment bias in 
the UK. It uses data from a large sample of individual investors and covers a historical period 
of nearly seven decades between the 1870s and the 1930s. Local investment bias is a 
relatively under-researched theme in the history of share ownership. This paper, by exploring 
                                                          
14 Acheson et al., ‘Corporate ownership’. 
15 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
16 This compares, for example, with an average number of shareholders of 6,177 for the 337 large UK registered 
companies studied by Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Managerial revolution’, p.1233. 
17 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’, p. 4041. 
18 Seasholes and Zhu, ‘Individual investors’; Petersen and Rajan, ‘Does distance matter’; Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, ‘Distance, language, and culture’. 
19 Seasholes and Zhu, ‘Individual investors’, p. 1987. The same definition is also used in economic history: 
Franks et al., ‘Ownership‘; Campbell and Turner, ‘Corporate governance’; Cottrell, ‘Industrial finance’, p. 91. 
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the spatial distribution of shareholders as a whole, and not just large shareholders or directors, 
aims to fill this gap in the literature and to address the extent of local bias, changes over time 
and differences across firms, as well as possible explanations for these trends. 
 
II 
 
The study of the patterns of local preference (that is, geographical dispersion) of individual 
share ownership for the nearly seven decades between the 1870s and the 1930s requires a 
careful sampling of shareholder and stockholder records. The records used in this paper were 
collected and sampled with two broad aims in mind: first, to include companies from 
different sectors that reflected the range of investment opportunities available to potential 
investors; second, to collect information about individuals that reflected the broad spectrum 
of those who held shares in these companies.20 The resulting sample includes 197 share 
records covering a variety of industry sectors, sizes (both in terms of issued nominal capital 
and of number of shareholders), longevity, location of operations (domestic, foreign, or 
colonial), type of securities available (ordinary, preference, fixed-interest), and status of 
companies (private/public).21 Particular emphasis was put on the geographical variation of the 
companies, securing a regional mix of operations in England and Wales as well as a mix of 
                                                          
20 The shareholding data used in this paper is based on data collected under the Economic and Social Research 
Council project: ‘Women investors in England and Wales, 1870-1930’ (award no. RES-000-23-1435). A more 
detailed description of the sampling methods can be found in Rutterford et al., ‘Researching shareholding’, pp. 
11-19 and idem., ‘Who comprised’. The sample in this paper extends the database by additionally collecting a 
series of key corporate performance and governance variables at the firm level. 
21 Sectors are agriculture (tea, rubber, coffee, sugar, tobacco), commercial (breweries, hotels, retail), 
manufacturing (engineering, steel, food, lighting), financial (banks, insurance, investment trusts), extractive 
(iron, coal, oil, gold), transport and communications (railways, tramways, telegraph, shipping), and utilities (gas, 
electricity, water). The sample was weighted by sector to reflect the range of investment opportunities available 
rather than represent their proportion of investment at the time, otherwise the majority of the sample would have 
been drawn from railway companies and government securities. See Rutterford et al., ‘Researching 
shareholding’, pp. 9-11. 
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domestic, foreign and empire operations.22 In this study, the observational unit is the 
individual investor. In order to achieve a representative population of industries and company 
sizes as available to potential investors at the time, smaller and unlisted companies were also 
included in the sample, for which less information was available than for the larger and listed 
companies. As a result, some corporate performance and governance variables were not 
available for all of the firms in our sample.23 
 The shareholding records were mostly derived from a company’s Form E – an annual 
statement that companies were required to file under the Companies Acts 1856 & 1862.24 
These Form Es were held either at The National Archives or at Companies House and include 
a company’s detailed equity capital structure as well as a register of all shareholders 
(including their name, address, occupation or marital status, and the amount of the holding).25 
They were required to be filed within 28 days of a company’s financial year end. Our sample 
includes, where available, one Form E per decade for each company, preferably taken at the 
start of the decade.26 For eight of the companies the full range from the 1870s to the 1930s 
was available. However, in order to include a mix of longevity and sectors – some of which, 
such as the automotive and oil industries, only emerged towards the end of our period – for 
the majority of companies we have a shorter range.27 A full coverage of all shareholdings was 
                                                          
22 This condition is important for the current study. By domestic, foreign or colonial, we mean firms registered 
in England or Wales but with domestic, foreign or colonial operations. 
23 Detailed summary statistics of our sample can be found in Table 1 of the online appendix. Panel (a) provides 
details of our full sample; panels (b) and (c) are subsamples with more information on corporate performance 
and governance but with less individual observations. Regression analysis in sections VI and VII that examines 
the determinants of local investment bias is based on all three subsamples. For detailed information on 
individual investor characteristics see Rutterford et al., ‘Who comprised’. 
24 In a few cases, such as Aspley Guise and Woburn Sands Gas Co. Ltd., the shareholder records were located in 
company archives. 
25 By the 1920s, though, many Form E’s did not include occupation. 
26 The choice of early years in each decade was to allow cross referencing with census data, collected in the first 
year of each decade. A complication was that there were different formats for the Form E’s: some companies 
kept separate shareholder lists for each of their securities and others submitted a joint record. In the case of 
separate registers we sampled for each list (e.g. creating a separate sample for ordinary and preference shares) 
while for joint registers we sampled the shareholders once and collected both security types as separate 
shareholdings.  
27 In order to be able to analyse change over time within as well as between companies, in all but one case 
(Tempeh Java Rubber Plantation) companies that had at least two shareholding records a decade apart were 
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not feasible, as the growth of shareholding over the course of the period meant that the 
registers grew increasingly large over time. Particularly by the 1920s and 1930s some of the 
larger companies, such as Barclays and Anglo-Persian Oil, had shareholder registers of over 
30,000 holders. In order to be able to cover a wide range of companies and years we sampled 
the shareholdings using random letter cluster sampling. This resulted in samples of between 
50 and 195 shareholders per share record.28 
 The key variable for our study is the distance between shareholders’ residence and 
companies’ registered headquarters. As a result, we only included in our sample shareholding 
records for which we were able to determine their location, leaving us with a set of 29,082 
holdings spread out over 197 share registers, across different points in time between 1870 and 
1930.29 
Table 1 panel (a) highlights the key investor characteristics in our sample. Using the 
geographic information system ArcGIS we plotted shareholders’ addresses and calculated the 
distances between their residential locations and those of the company’s registered office, the 
London Stock Exchange, and the nearest local stock exchange that listed the security.30 Panel 
(b) of Table 2 reports the geographical breakdown of the investors in our sample and 
                                                          
selected. The distribution of share registers over the period reflects the rise of the total number of securities 
available on the stock market: for the period 1870s-1900 we have 57 registers, while the period 1900-1930s 
includes 140.  
28 In order to achieve a reflection of the broad spectrum of shareholders of a company we sampled shareholders 
from at least three random letters of the alphabet (to reduce the likelihood of sampling directors’ families) and 
starting at a random page within a letter (many companies kept records that started with the existing 
shareholders and added new shareholders at the end of the letter section). 
29 The total number of shareholdings available was 30,864. In 876 cases the address was left blank, and an 
additional 570 addresses were either incomplete, ambiguous, or illegible. A further 336 addresses were not 
located in Britain (including those in Ireland for the whole of our period), which left a total of 29,082. We have 
included shareholders with a Scottish address in this analysis. The distances between individual shareholders 
and company registered offices or stock exchanges have been calculated on the basis of the address given in the 
registers. For some individuals the address was available down to the street level, but most registers just 
provided the town (in case of smaller towns/villages) or the parish level or post code (for larger towns). In these 
cases the centre of that town or parish has been used to locate that individual. Distances have been calculated in 
the geographic information system ArcGIS, and all distances are as the crow flies. This does not reflect real 
travel distances by road but, in the absence of route-planners for each of our decades, this is the best measure of 
distance available. 
30 For the purposes of this paper, distance was calculated in a straight line, not taking into account roads, modes 
of transport or different connections.  
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compares it with a study by Ellinger and Carter for the Financial Times based on 1941 
shareholder registers.31 The latter is over 5 years later than the latest data in our sample but it 
is the most relevant study that we could use as a point of reference. By and large, our results 
are in line with those reported by Ellinger and Carter. This provides evidence that our 
shareholder sample is geographically representative. 
 
[TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
 
 For the companies in our sample we additionally collected some key performance and 
governance variables (see the Appendix) to be used in our regression analysis in sections VI 
and VII. These variables appear as common regressors in related studies. As already 
mentioned, this type of information was not available for all the firms in our sample. For our 
full sample (shown in panel (a) of Table 1 of the online appendix), we were able to sample 
the age of the company at the time of the investment (calculated by subtracting the year of 
incorporation from the register’s date); the size of the company either based on the number of 
shareholders or issued nominal capital; the presence of uncalled capital; the nominal value of 
the share; the number of stock exchanges on which the security was listed;32 and the nominal 
value of individual investment. The majority of the information was available on the Form E 
and has been cross-checked with the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (SEOI). 
 For 115 share records of our sample we additionally collected information about the 
number of directors in charge of the company in the year of the sampled share register and 
the titles they held (if any); the value and type of shares that a shareholder was required to 
hold in order to qualify as a director (directors’ qualifications); and the voting structure of 
                                                          
31 Ellinger and Carter, ‘How many investors are there?’. 
32 A full list of UK stock exchanges (LSE and provincial stock exchanges) during the period under consideration 
in this study can be found in Edelstein, Overseas investment, p. 56. 
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the body of shareholders, which could either be linear (votes reflected shares) or graduated 
(up to 10 shares 1 vote, between 10 and 100 shares 2 votes etc.). This additional corporate 
governance information was only available for companies listed in the SEOI, and as a result 
these factors can only be tested on a subsection of our data. 
 Another subsample of 74 share records further includes price and dividend yields of 
each security during the year sampled and over the previous 3 years. This was based on the 
price and yield stated in the December issue of the Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM). 
Where this information was unavailable in the IMM but was listed in the SEOI we have 
included the SEOI value.33 This subsample is rich in information on corporate performance 
and governance variables but contains less observations on individual shareholders and is 
without any firms in the first two decades (1870s and 1880s) of our period of investigation. A 
detailed description of all these variables and the sources can be found in the Appendix to this 
paper. 
 
III 
 
Table 2 provides information relating to the distance between the residence of individual 
investors and the registered headquarters of the company in which they invested. Our 
findings, which cover nearly seven decades between 1870s and 1930s, reveal the same local 
biases34 as those reported by Franks et al. for their 1910 sample.35 The local investment bias 
is indicated by the fact that the median distance is significantly lower than the mean in all 
cases. In other words, the geographical distribution of investors around firms' headquarters 
                                                          
33 In the cases where both were available these were generally very similar values – however IMM was 
preferred. 
34 As explained above, the term ‘local bias’ is a theoretical concept referring to the concentration of investors 
around firms’ registered headquarters. It does not refer to any statistical bias in our sample. 
35 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
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presents a strong positive skewness indicating a concentration around headquarters. This 
local investment preference persists in all security types or sectors, as shown in the rows of 
Table 2. Investors’ geographical concentration around firms’ headquarters is also captured by 
the last three columns of Table 2 that calculate the percentage of investors who lived within a 
small radius of firms’ headquarters. Victorian and Edwardian investors tilted their savings 
towards local firms to a significant extent: about 40 per cent of them on average lived within 
25km of the firm’s registered office and about 25 per cent within a distance of 6km.36 While 
this tendency was similar across security types and sectors, in Table 2 the overall 
geographical concentration was noticeably higher for the holders of private and unlisted 
securities (debentures usually fell into this category) and investors in utilities (which all had 
domestic, regional spheres of operation).37 Table 3 shows the local investment preference 
from an alternative angle, grouping companies by the county in which they were based. As 
expected, a significant part of their investor base came from the same county. 
 
[TABLES 2 and 3 NEAR HERE] 
 
 We calculate that the average concentration of shareholders within 10km of firms’ 
headquarters was 30.8 per cent for the whole period between the 1870s and the 1930s. This 
estimate is considerably lower than the average number of 56 per cent offered by Franks et al. 
for their 1910 sample (for the same distance: 6 miles), which contains only firms listed on the 
LSE.38 In our sample, about 20 per cent of owners of LSE-listed shares in the 1910s lived 
                                                          
36 In most of our calculations in the rest of the paper (including our regressions) we have chosen the distance of 
25 km to represent 'local'. This definition allows us to avoid confusion between actual shifts in local investment 
bias and changes in the population density around central city districts due to the geographical spreading out of 
urban populations (including the shareholders) during the investigated period. Even in the largest city in our 
analysis, London, the vast majority of this development took place within the radius of 25 km (see Clark, 'Urban 
population densities', p. 493). 
37 Rutterford et al., ‘Who comprised’, p. 187. 
38 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’, p. 4041. 
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within a range of 10km; this calculation differs significantly from Franks et al.’s 56 per cent 
figure.39 In our view, Franks et al. overestimate local bias because their sample contains small 
firms with an average total of 320 shareholders (compared with Foreman-Peck and Hannah’s 
estimate of 6,177 for 337 companies in 1911).40 In Table 4 (see in the next section below), we 
note that Franks et al.’s estimate agrees with our local bias estimate for small domestic firms 
(size lower than £100,000). Thus, a sample with small-sized firms is expected to have a 
higher local bias in the geographical concentration of their investors. 
 According to the literature on local bias, local preference in investment choice is the 
result of individuals trying to overcome informational asymmetries or even paucities of 
information.41 If investors lived close to headquarters, many of them 'would have had 
personal knowledge of the proprietors and their businesses or would at least have been 
personally familiar with the business environment in which the company is operating’.42 In 
the above-mentioned context of inadequate legal protection of outsiders during the period 
under investigation, local investment bias could be expected to substitute for the lack of 
formal security for investors. Franks et al. additionally argue that local investment preference 
is a clear sign of the establishment of an ‘informal trust relationship’ between ordinary 
investors and firm directors.43 Local investment bias can thus be seen as an early form of risk 
reduction, achieved by developing special relationships with the firm or participating in the 
already existing local business networks around directors. Given the lack of formal 
protection, local bias could possibly be an additional explanation of the rise in demand for 
corporate securities, if geographic proximity were seen as a means of curbing insider 
                                                          
39 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’, p. 4041. 
40 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’, p. 4010; Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Managerial revolution’, p. 1223. The latter 
also mention that the numbers of shareholders ranged widely: 'from only 170 [...] up to 79,400 [...]' (ibid.). 
41Petersen and Rajan, ‘Does distance matter’, p. 2533; Seasholes and Zhu, ‘Individual investors’, pp. 1987-8; 
Cheffins, Corporate ownership, p. 42. 
42 Cheffins, Corporate ownership, p. 42. 
43 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’, p. 4040. For a similar point see also Campbell and Turner, ‘Corporate 
governance’, and Petersen and Rajan, ‘Does distance matter’. 
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opportunism. This is evident in the case of the holders of private and unlisted securities where 
information asymmetries were relatively higher due to the illiquid character of these 
securities (see Table 2). For these securities, almost 50 per cent of investors lived within 
25km of the company’s registered office and almost 35 per cent of them within 6km.   
 There is a growing literature emphasizing the role of trust in financial transactions.44 
Traditionally the concept of trust has been associated with discussions around ‘social capital’ 
and its economic implications.45 In the light of these debates, the term 'trust' can also take an 
additional twist: it can signify non-calculative shared norms, values and modalities of action 
that promote economic cooperation.46 Regardless of investors’ attitudes towards market 
asymmetries, local bias may also be the outcome of a particular investment culture which 
may have favoured local security holdings for reasons that are not necessarily explained by 
cost-benefit analysis. For instance, in the Arnold Bennett novel Anna of the Five Towns, first 
published in 1902, we find the following description of the portfolio of local securities that 
Anna’s father had bought with his dead wife’s inheritance, and which he was handing over to 
Anna on her 21st birthday: 
 
He was proud. They were the finest in the market, the aristocracy of investments, based on 
commercial enterprises of which every businessman in the Five Towns knew the entire 
soundness. They conferred distinction on the possessor, like a great picture or a rare volume. 
They stifled all questions and insinuations. Put before a jury of the Five Towns as evidence of 
character, they would almost have exculpated a murderer.47 
                                                          
44 To mention but a few: Lamoreaux, ‘New England case’; Becht et al., ‘Shareholder activism’; Petersen and 
Rajan, ‘Does distance matter’; Grinblatt and Keloharju, ‘Distance, language, and culture’; Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales, ‘Trusting’. 
45 Despite the enormous literature on trust and social capital, there is no general agreement about the content of 
these terms and the differences become even more striking among different disciplines in social sciences. For a 
summary of relevant viewpoints see: Mayer, ‘Trust in financial markets’, Dasgupta and Serageldin, Social 
capital, Fukuyama, ‘Social capital’, and Glaeser et al., ‘What is social capital’. 
46 Mayer, ‘Trust in financial markets’; Fukuyama, ‘Social capital’; Stulz and Williamson, ‘Culture, openness, 
and finance’. 
47 Bennett, Anna, p. 46. 
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The passage above may capture the investment spirit of the time. The father placed his trust 
in local firms for two separate reasons. First, he was as sure about their economic soundness 
as any other local businessman.48 This is in line with the standard explanation that investors 
tilted their portfolios towards local firms to protect themselves against significant market 
asymmetries and related manipulation by insiders. At the same time, the passage also reveals 
a possible second element in local bias: local shares were also prestigious assets. Their 
holders enjoyed a special social status and recognition in the context of shared norms and 
investment cultures. This view may offer an additional explanation for local bias.49 
 
IV 
 
The local investment bias we have observed in our sample followed a declining pattern over 
time. Table 4 reports these changes. Despite small differences across security types and 
sectors (panel a), the overall local concentration of security holders (i.e. the percentage of 
investors living within 25km of company registered offices) fell from 70 per cent in the 
1870s to 35 per cent in the 1930s (first column of Table 4a). The trend for ordinary 
shareholders closely reflected the overall pattern. Local concentration of investors in unlisted 
securities and debentures remained higher throughout the period, but also followed a similar 
declining trend. Panel (b) of Table 4 reports the pattern of local bias for domestic and non-
domestic firms that belong to different size bands. Smaller firms showed higher local investor 
                                                          
48 For instance, a 1911 text advised investors: 'it is a good principle to remember that if an enterprise is really 
very promising, money will somehow be found locally, by those who have seen it with their own eyes' (cited in 
Cheffins, Corporate Ownership, p. 211). 
49 The passage offers some evidence in favour of our perspective. There also a growing literature emphasizing 
the importance of narrative theory in business history: see Hansen, ‘Narrative approach’. In this paragraph we 
described our explanation of local bias. In what follows we will use the two terms interchangeably denoting the 
same effect. 
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concentration, while differences between domestic and non-domestic firms were typically not 
particularly important. Thus, regardless of size, local investor bias declined with time except 
for very large domestic firms where local concentration of investors remained at the 30% 
level during the whole time period. Since improvements in corporate law were not major 
during the period50 and local bias was not translated into superior returns (according to our 
own calculations), the question regarding the decline in local investment preference, and, 
thus, the de-localization of ‘trust’, remains open. 
 
[TABLE 4 NEAR HERE] 
 
 There may be several reasons for this historical trend. The revolution in 
communications, with the gradual introduction of the telegraph and the telephone (the latter 
especially after the turn of the century) in security transactions, significantly reduced the 
information asymmetries between regional exchanges and the London Stock Exchange, 
making ordinary investors more easily to break with local bias.51 According to Michie, this 
development opened up the possibility of a single market in securities that ‘would correspond 
to national, rather than to local, supply and demand conditions’.52 At the same time, various 
innovations may have also changed the perception of proximity among investors: 
technological advances (especially those related to transportation) might have reshaped the 
scale of ‘local’ in people’s minds.53 Several financial innovations, like the gradual adoption 
of diversification, as well as other institutional developments in security trading such as the 
decline of uncalled capital, lower nominal share values and cross-listing, may have also 
                                                          
50 Cheffins, ‘Does law matter?’; see also our discussion in section I. 
51 Michie, Stock exchanges, pp. 8-14. 
52 Michie, Stock exchanges, p. 10. See also Rutterford, ‘International diversification’. 
53 For example, Rutterford, in ‘The shareholder voice’ (p. 130), cites the Midland Railway Company as laying 
on special trains to the annual general meeting in Coventry for those investors living in Manchester and London. 
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influenced investors’ attitude towards risk and market asymmetries, making ordinary 
investors more tolerant to distance.54 Finally, cultural changes in the perception of the 
investment process should also be taken into consideration. The rise of the importance of 
stock exchange transactions (the establishment of the so-called ‘equity culture’) and the 
growing encouragement to diversify internationally by publications such as The Financial 
Review of Reviews in the first decade of the twentieth century may well have eroded the 
prestigious character of local holdings and possibly made people more comfortable with 
holding the securities of distant firms. As the number of securities listed on the London Stock 
Exchange increased, the number of financial periodicals grew – from 19 in 1874 to 109 in 
1914 – boosted by cable communication, the growth in the number of limited liability 
companies and the increased demand for prospectus advertising.55 Investors were gradually 
more guided by sources of advice in their investment behaviour and this might also have 
affected their reliance on local trust networks. The growing involvement of women as 
shareholders in various kinds of enterprise might also have added to the decline in local 
bias.56 
 There were also some improvements in corporate disclosure in the early 1900s. For 
instance, 'the Companies Act 1900 obliged companies to appoint an auditor but did not 
require that the auditor be professionally qualified'.57 At the same time, the Companies Act 
1907, the provisions of which became operative in 1908, requested companies, which 
distributed shares to the public without prospectus, to prepare a statement in lieu of 
                                                          
54 The establishment of the 'equity culture' (Hannah, 'Global trends', p. 406) may have developed certain norms 
among investors and principal actors in corporate governance in line with workings of free markets (Coffee, ‘Do 
norms matter’; Stulz and Williamson, ‘Culture, openness, and finance’). At the same time, we should also take 
into account the gradual rise of financial innovations, such as diversification after the turn of the century (see: 
Rutterford, ‘International diversification’, Goetzmann and Ukhov, ‘Portfolio theory approach’, Foreman-Peck 
and Hannah, ‘Managerial revolution’, p.6). 
55 See Porter, 'A Trusted Guide', p.1. These figures do not include the ‘bucket shop’ newspapers which had 
largely disappeared by the 1890s. Jefferys, Business organization, p. 355. 
56 See Rutterford et al., ‘Who comprised’. 
57 Cheffins, Corporate ownership, p. 195. 
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prospectus.58 'Companies also became obliged from this point onwards to file publicly a 
balance sheet, but little guidance was offered to companies on the format to be used and there 
was no requirement to file a profit and loss account, meaning that companies were not under 
a statutory onus to provide data on current earnings'.59 Part of the decline in local bias might 
have been influenced by this minimal improvement in protection to outside investors. 
Nevertheless, such improvements in corporate disclosure were inadequate and changed very 
gradually from 1900 to 1940 so protection of outsiders remained scant.60 
 Table 5 reveals the importance of London61 as an economic centre. Throughout the 
whole period, London residents had a strong preference for local firms: about 80 per cent to 
90 per cent of London-based investors did not allow their investments to extend beyond 
London registered firms (including foreign and empire firms which for our sample were all 
registered in London). London investors thus maintained a strong local bias contrary to the 
typical non-Londoner whose local bias declined substantially over time. For example, in the 
1870s, investors from the rest of the UK showed a significant local preference in their 
investments, as 64 per cent of them chose local firms (within 25 km).62 This number was 
reduced to 16 per cent nearly seven decades later.63 This outcome is further supported by the 
                                                          
58 Cheffins, Corporate ownership, p. 196. 
59 Cheffins, Corporate ownership, p. 196. 
60 See Edwards (Financial accounting, p.128) and Cheffins (Corporate ownership, p. 195). According to 
Musacchio and Turner (Does the law, Table 4), anti-director rights index, ex post private control of self-dealing 
and creditor protection index did not vary between 1900 and 1950. 
61 In order to accommodate London’s growth over this time, our definition of London has been constructed 
differently pre-1900 and post-1900, consistent with ‘zone 1’ and ‘zone 2’ as defined by the 1921 UK census. 
Pre-1900 London is restricted to the administrative county of London (the City of London plus the 28 
metropolitan boroughs), while post-1900 it has been extended to include the administrative districts that fall 
roughly within a 10-mile radius of Charing Cross.  
62 From the late 1870s UK stock exchanges were in constant telegraphic contact suggesting the existence of a 
competitive national market (Edelstein, Overseas investment, p. 57). Around 1900 inter-market communication 
was replaced by a private telephone wire (Michie, Stock exchanges, p. 14). Local investors outside London had 
different investment alternatives for distant firms from the 1870s. 
63 The broad outlook of non-London investors is evidenced in the information published in local newspapers. 
For example, the Sheffield Daily Telegraph of 1 January 1870 included price lists for British railways, some 
foreign railways, and London-registered companies including Crystal Palace, London General Omnibus 
Company, and Anglo-American Telegraph (p.3). By 1 April 1903, the Manchester Courier and Lancashire 
General Advertiser (p. 4) included prices for British domestic, empire and foreign stocks and railway securities; 
for African and Australian mining shares; for prices  of shares in all LSE listed sectors; and for share prices of 
listed securities and details of deals done for unlisted securities from the Manchester Stock Exchange. 
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third column in Table 5. Local bias declined significantly for firms with registered 
headquarters outside London. For those firms, 84% of investors were living within 25km of 
the company’s registered office in the 1870s; this figure fell to 30% in the 1930s. The point 
thus remains: local investment bias gradually became a London habit. It was stronger 
amongst London investors than amongst the investors in the rest of the UK. As mentioned by 
Edelstein: ‘familiar with local business through the newspapers, consumption, and work 
activities, the London investor was probably more easily, and therefore more cheaply, 
convinced of the worthiness of an investment in a local enterprise’.64 The predominant 
position of London as an economic hub provides additional insight into the discussion of 
local bias and trust that has not been captured by existing research.65 
 
[TABLE 5 NEAR HERE] 
 
 The rise of provincial stock exchanges from the second half of the nineteenth century 
has often been interpreted as an attempt by firms to attract local investors 'playing an 
important role in the development of trust between directors and investors'.66 Campbell and 
Turner offer some evidence that local listing established a positive relation between the value 
of the firm and the size of the board of directors in the Victorian era.67 According to the 
authors, a larger board of directors could support a greater size of local trust networks, 
thereby enhancing the value of the firm. In our sample, the majority of listed securities were 
listed on local stock exchanges, with many of them preferring cross listings.68 This is 
evidence in favour of the above reasoning. The geographical distribution of individual 
                                                          
64 Edelstein, Overseas Investment, p. 53. 
65 An implication of that, for instance, could be that samples containing London headquartered shareholdings 
will tend to overestimate local bias. 
66 Franks et al, ‘Ownership’, p. 4040; Edelstein, Overseas Investment. 
67 Campbell and Turner, ‘Corporate governance’, p. 592. 
68 Information about the security cross listings in our dataset can be found in Table 2 of the online appendix. 
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investors in relation to the nearest stock exchange on which their securities were listed69 is 
similar to their distribution in relation to firms' headquarters. Or, in other words, a local 
listing was a motive to invest in local firms. This is clear from Table 6 which shows results 
similar to those of Table 4. 
 
[TABLE 6 NEAR HERE] 
 
However, investor concentration around the nearest stock exchange (on which their securities 
were listed) is more clustered than for registered offices. From an initial concentration of 52.4 
per cent, by the 1920s roughly 42 per cent of investors continued to live within a close 
distance (25km) of the nearest exchange on which the security was listed. Despite a 
significant decline, local bias in relation to securities markets remained quite high, higher 
than the numbers in Table 4. The greater persistence of local concentration levels can be 
explained by the fact that some firms gradually cross-listed their securities on different 
exchanges. If investors decided to invest in a distant firm, they would probably choose one 
whose securities were listed on a local market. Table 7 reports the bias related to the London 
Stock Exchange for each decade. Throughout the period, London absorbed the vast majority 
of UK investments for this sample of shareholders: more than 95 per cent of Londoners and 
more than 80 per cent of non-Londoners held an LSE-listed security.70 The differences 
between the economic and financial geographies of London and the rest of the UK are 
                                                          
69 We do not know, however, if the nearest stock exchange on which the security was listed was the one actually 
used by the investor in the case of a cross-listed security. 
70 While 'local investors were automatically involved' in long-term finance of local firms, larger issues were 
gradually targeted at the LSE given the depth of the London market and the relative advantage of its specialised 
services (Edelstein, Overseas investment, pp. 57-8)  
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striking. As with registered offices, our analysis of local investment bias with respect to stock 
exchanges reflects the predominance of the London market, in particular as time went on.71 
 
[TABLE 7 NEAR HERE] 
 
 
V 
 
So far, our analysis has investigated local investment bias with respect to the geographical 
distribution of individual investors. Panel (a) of Table 8 shows the geographical distribution 
not of investors but of investment (the value of individual investment as it is defined in the 
Appendix), for several types of security categories of firms registered in London and in the 
rest of the UK. Again, the difference between the mean and the median of individual 
investment is a clear sign of skewness, which implies the same local bias in its geographical 
distribution. This gap between the mean and the median persists for different security types in 
firms with London and non-London headquarters. The last three columns of Table 8 (a) 
report the concentration of investment within 6km, 10km and 25km of firms’ registered 
offices. Almost 50% of total investment came from local investors for London-based firms; 
the equivalent figure was 42% for firms registered in the rest of the UK. These numbers are 
higher than the local concentration of investors reported in Table 3. The same result holds for 
all security types with the exception of debentures issued by non-London firms.72 The fact 
                                                          
71 The overall trends in local bias remained the same between men and women. While women represented just a 
small proportion of investors in the 1870s, only 15% by number, women gradually increased in importance as 
investors, reaching 45% by number by the 1930s. However, the average size of individual investment for 
women was much lower than for men throughout the period, but the difference declined over time. A significant 
proportion of investors of both genders remained within a small distance from firms’ headquarters. There is no 
indication of a different behavioural pattern in relation to gender. 
72 On further investigation, the debentures of London-based firms were railway debentures which were likely to 
be held by City of London-based trustees or by London-based investors as trustee stock. The two non-London 
based companies represented a very small sample. 
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that local investment was more concentrated than for local investors implies that investors 
with higher investment holding values (i.e. higher stakes in the firms and probably wealthier) 
showed higher local investment preference.73 
 
[TABLE 8 NEAR HERE] 
 
 This outcome is also clear from panel (b) of Table 8. The top 25% of investors by 
value of holdings (i.e. the wealthier investors) account for the vast majority (over 80%) of the 
investment in firms regardless of firm size. The majority of this top 25% investment comes 
from local investors, while a considerable proportion derives from London. From Table 8 
panel (b) we can also see that, for the top 25% of local investors, the difference between their 
investment contribution to the firms and their importance as a percentage of the total number 
of investors also supports the finding that people with higher value individual holdings were 
more inclined towards local firms. This finding is in line with our theoretical assumption that 
informational asymmetries were the main drivers of local investment bias. 
 
VI 
 
This section attempts to identify possible factors that influenced the geographical diffusion of 
investors observed in earlier sections. It focuses on the investor level and explores 
econometrically the local investment preference of individual investors in relation to a series 
of explanatory variables as they are defined in the Appendix to this paper.74 
                                                          
73 As we mention below, this outcome is further supported by our regression results. 
74 This type of question is in line with contemporary research on local bias: see Seasholes and Zhu, ‘Individual 
investors’; Petersen and Rajan, ‘Does distance matter’; Grinblatt and Keloharju, ‘Distance, language, and 
culture’. Our choice to proceed with regressions at the investor level is also justified by Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(ibid, p. 1057). In our regression specification we use explanatory variables observed at three different levels: 
the firm level (share record), the security level and the individual investor level. To avoid statistical biases in the 
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 In relation to the above analysis and empirical findings, we define local bias as a 
dichotomous qualitative variable. For every individual investor in our sample, there is either 
local investment preference or not. This type of research question suggests a binary 
regression model (we choose a logit specification), where the dependent variable is a dummy: 
it takes a value of 0 if the investor lives within 25km of a firm’s registered headquarters 
(indicating local bias) and the value of 1 elsewhere.75 
 In our econometric specification we follow the perspective of the individual investor. 
The structure of our dependent variable in the logit regression models allows us to ask the 
following question: what made investors break with local investment preference? The 
coefficients in the logit model capture the marginal effects of an infinitesimal change in the 
explanatory variables on the odds (likelihood) of observing loss of local bias.76 The analytical 
list, description and sources of the explanatory variables can be found in the Appendix to this 
paper, whilst details of their collection and sampling were given in section II. 
 Regression results for our multivariate models of local bias are reported in Table 9. 
Since information on all the explanatory variables was not available for all the firms in our 
                                                          
calculation of standard errors, we need to relax the homoscedasticity assumption and allow the error terms to be 
heteroscedastic and correlated for the explanatory variables that vary within share records. In our regressions we 
have followed the canonical method of clustered standard errors; the robustness of the results has also been 
checked using a nonparametric block bootstrap which is also suggested by the literature (for a summary, see 
Angrist and Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics). The grouping of data at the firm level would raise critical 
issues of aggregation (in most cases aggregation would not be meaningful), discarding information and not 
allowing us to test important relationships. Moreover, as is typically accepted in the literature, the un-weighted 
grouped standard errors are not reliable, whilst weighted aggregation could not be used because not all 
regressors are fixed at the company (group) level and would not make much sense in the logit specification 
(ibid.). The reader can find in Table 4 of the online appendix to this paper some preliminary regression analysis 
at the firm level (due to the issues mentioned above, we were not able to use all the explanatory variables). In 
what follows, the reader should bear in mind that regression analysis cannot demonstrate causality; it assesses 
correlation. 
75 Cottrell, Industrial Finance, in an early survey of geographical bias in the 1860s and 1880s, chose 10 miles as 
a cut-off point. Franks et al. also use 6 miles as a cut-off point but find, in 1900, a median distance of 15 miles 
(24km) from the registered office for their 1900 sample. Given the long time period we are covering and the 
increasing geographical spread of cities like London, we have chosen a cut-off distance of 25km (15.5 miles). 
See also our comment in footnote 36. 
76 In the logit model, the logarithm of the odds to break with local bias (that is, the probability for an investor to 
break with local bias divided by the probability not to break) is regressed against a series of explanatory 
variables. While the signs of the coefficients capture the positive or negative effect of the correlation, the 
interpretation of the coefficients is different from regular OLS models. 
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full sample, as we move from model (1) to (9) we are left with less individual investor 
observations but more information on firm governance and performance. 
 
[TABLE 9 NEAR HERE] 
 
 Table 9 does not show a statistically significant effect for company size and this result 
is consistent across the various model specifications. However, the age of the firm seems to 
have a small negative effect for the top 25 per cent of shareholders (according to the value of 
their investment): older firms had a slightly higher probability of having local wealthy 
investors with large stakes. One possible explanation is that, the older the firm, the greater 
was the initial local bias of people with large investments preferring to be close to directors’ 
meetings at company headquarters. Stickiness of shareholdings over time would mean it took 
longer for this local bias to disappear.77 
 The regression results relating to the number of company directors further endorse the 
possible existence of local trust networks between directors and investors. Table 9 shows a 
negative relationship between the number of directors and the geographical dispersion of 
either all investors or the holders of ordinary shares. The results are also statistically 
significant for directors with titles. Interpreting these results, an additional director on the 
board reduced the odds to break with local preference by roughly 5 per cent. The same effect 
seems to be stronger for every additional director holding a (prestigious) title. Directors with 
titles were more likely to be respected (and thus 'trusted') than local directors.  
According to Campbell and Turner, local bias implies informal trust relations and 
some sort of acquaintance between investors and directors that also serves as a means of 
                                                          
77 See Rutterford, ‘International diversification’. 
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outsiders protection (a substitute for weak formal protection).78 This is also in line with 
Franks et al.79 In Table 9, it seems that an increase in the number of directors is positively 
associated with local investment bias. A possible explanation might be that more people on 
the board could accommodate a larger size of local informal networks as a means to 
overcome informational asymmetries.80 According to our results, the effect is more likely to 
exist among holders of ordinary shares, in which risk was higher when compared with 
preferred shares and debentures. 
Most of the firms in our sample, even relating to registers in the nineteenth century, 
cross listed (some of) their securities on more than one stock exchange. Table 9 reveals a 
statistically significant negative relationship between the number of stock exchanges on 
which a security was listed and local investment preference that survives across different 
specifications. An additional cross-listing increased the odds of undermining local trust by 
roughly 14 per cent. Investors were probably more willing to break with local bias if there 
was a local (cross-)listing of the distant firm in which they were planning to invest. After the 
1900s, a considerable number of securities are listed on 2 or more stock markets.81 This 
increase overlaps with the general decline in local bias as shown above. This relationship is 
also statistically significant in our regression results. In our background regression analysis, 
when we repeated the same type of regressions for the local bias in relation to the nearest 
stock exchange (from investor residence), on which the security was listed, there was a 
statistically significant negative relation with the number of stock exchanges. These negative 
signs can be explained on the same basis as can the positive signs in the specifications of 
Table 9: the increase in the number of cross-listings brings security markets closer to 
                                                          
78 Campbell and Turner, ‘Corporate governance’, p. 592. 
79 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
80 This finding actually suggests that the formation of informal trust networks around directors causes a 
relatively survival of the local investment bias. 
81 In the online appendix, Table 2 provides more information on the development of cross listings per security 
type and decade in our dataset. 
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investors distant from firms’ headquarters, thereby increasing the probability of local bias 
with respect to the local stock exchange.82Risk, captured in the volatility of security prices, is 
expected to make investors less willing to overcome local preference. We define risk in the 
same way as Foreman-Peck and Hannah, that is, ‘by the dispersion of the share price-
difference between highest and lowest share price for the year, normalised by the average of 
the two’.83 Our findings are partially contrary to the above hypothesis and rather 
counterintuitive. Price volatility is statistically significant and positively related to 
geographical dispersion for shares (both ordinary and preferred) but negatively related for 
debentures. This means that higher price volatility was a motive for someone to keep local 
investment preference only for fixed income securities, which were considered as a relatively 
safer investment. In other words, investors seemed to have been (more) risk averse only for 
less risky investments. Price volatility may have been ignored in practice if investors felt sure 
about the survival of the company.84 Our findings support this perspective, although revealing 
a sensitivity to price volatility when it came to notionally safer investments. 
 The existing literature emphasises the importance of dividends as a means of ‘keeping 
investors on side’ for the period under consideration.85 From an investor’s perspective, 
dividend yield was a primary concern and there is also some evidence that dividend yields 
may have served as protection for outside investors in the Victorian period.86 Our results do 
not provide support for this argument.87 There is also some evidence that the higher the value 
of individual holdings, the more concerned investors were with risks related to informational 
                                                          
82 Regression analysis of local preference in relation to the nearest stock exchange on which the security was 
listed, can be found in Table 3 of the online appendix to this paper. 
83 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership from control’, p. 550. 
84 Rutterford, ‘Equity valuation techniques’; idem, ‘International diversification’. 
85 For a summary see Cheffins, Corporate ownership. 
86 Rutterford, ‘Equity valuation techniques’; Campbell and Turner, ‘Corporate governance’. 
87 The Economist in 1911 argued that: ‘Yorkshire and Lancashire … take care not to send anything really 
profitable up to London’ (cited in Cheffins, Corporate Ownership, p. 211). In other words, high dividend yields 
could be protection against asymmetries but also a motive to stay with local profitable firms. There could have 
been two countertendencies offsetting each other. This might explain our regression results with regard to 
dividend yields. 
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asymmetries, and thus the less likely to break with local bias. Nevertheless, this effect is not 
statistically significant in all model specifications. Table 9 does not offer evidence for the 
impact of non-linear voting schemes on local bias. Finally, the persistence of local bias 
remained very strong among Londoners. These statistically significant results in Table 9 with 
respect to London investors are consistent with the results reported in earlier sections. 
 
VII 
 
Foreman-Peck and Hannah examine London firms with over £1 million quoted share capital 
in 1911.88 They argue that, given the very low levels of director ownership and voting 
control, ‘quoted company ownership was already divorced from managerial control’.89 One 
of the interesting questions that arises from this finding is how geographical dispersion of 
investors and local bias was influenced by the UK managerial revolution. According to 
Jefferys, as shareholder lists lengthened, shareholders started residing in areas remote from 
the firm’s headquarters, thus making investment impersonal.90 In other words, the dispersion 
of ownership is expected to be in line with the geographical dispersion of shareholdings 
(owners). Franks et al. offer evidence against this analytical assumption.91 For their 1920s 
sample, they estimate that ‘the greater the distance between the shareholders and the 
companies’ headquarters, the more concentrated the ownership'.92 Cheffins also argues that 
division between ownership and control is not necessarily related to the dispersion of 
shareholdings.93 
                                                          
88 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Managerial revolution’; idem, ‘Divorce of ownership from control’. 
89 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Managerial revolution’, p. 1. 
90 Jefferys, Business organisation, pp. 386-7. 
91 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
92 Franks et al. ‘Ownership’, p. 4044. 
93 Cheffins, 'Does law matter', p. 468. 
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 Using the calculations of the study of Foreman-Peck and Hannah of company 
directors, we create a subsample that contains the largest firms listed on the LSE during the 
10 years either side of 1911 of our original full sample that matches Foreman-Peck’s and 
Hannah’s study.94 We repeat the logit regressions of Table 9 adding two additional 
independent variables: voting control of the board and directors’ shareholdings expressed as 
a ratio of the nominal size of the firm. Table 10 reports the results. 
 
[TABLE 10 NEAR HERE] 
 
Voting and share size control by directors both have a clear statistically significant but 
negative effect on the odds of the dependent variable. This means that directors’ control over 
the firm was positively related to local bias; a finding in line with Jefferys but not Franks et 
al.95 An increase in directors’ voting control by one unit reduced the odds of breaking with 
local bias by roughly 10 to 20 per cent. The marginal effect of directors’ ownership was by 
and large of equal size. It seems that the divorce of ownership from control was related to 
geographical dispersion. The above-mentioned positive effects on local investment bias of the 
number of directors and the risk of debentures survive in the results of Table 10 (the 
coefficients of the value of individual investment also have the same signs). Additionally, an 
increase in the value of holdings required to qualify as a director (directorial qualifications) 
undermined local bias. We also obtain, for this sample, a positive relationship between 
uncalled capital and local bias. The higher uncalled capital, the less likely to break with local 
bias. This result is to be expected, given the higher risk of ordinary shares with uncalled 
capital. 
                                                          
94 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Managerial revolution’. The details of this sample can be found in Table 5 of the 
online appendix of the paper. 
95 Jefferies, Business organisation; Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
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 In the context of our above discussion, one possible explanation of the negative 
relationship between local investment bias and directors’ control can be that the diminishing 
role of directors in decision making made local trust networks less important for the average 
investor. In other words, local bias can be seen as a form of protection of minority holders 
against the expropriation by insiders. 
 
VIII 
 
This paper is the first systematic attempt to reveal and study local investment preference in 
the UK between the 1870s and the 1930s. While local bias is a standard theme in 
contemporary financial research (where ‘local’ usually captures the short distance between 
firms’ headquarters and investors’ residence), there is no relevant empirical research in the 
context of economic history, with the exception of Franks et al.96 This paper uses a very large 
sample of nearly 30,000 shareholders based on 197 sets of share records, a large and 
representative database of the UK investor population across sectors and time. It investigates 
the structure and the evolution of local investment bias between shareholders and the 
companies in which they invested. 
 Investors in the past, as is also the case today,97 tilted their portfolios towards locally 
headquartered stocks. Although there are some differences across sectors and security types, 
which are also influenced by the size of the firm (samples based on small firms might 
overestimate local bias), overall almost 70 per cent of investors lived within 25km of firms’ 
                                                          
96 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
97 Although, given developments in technology and financial engineering, the scale of local bias is now 
different. For instance, 'the typical U.S. household has about 30% of its portfolio invested in stocks 
headquartered within a 250-mile radius of the family's home. [...] In Finland, the median non-Helsinki-
headquartered firm has 12% greater weight among investors in its municipality than it does among all Finnish 
investors. And, in mainland China, individuals invest 8% more in firms from their province of residence than a 
market capitalization portfolio would predict' (Seasholes and Zhu, 'Individual investors', p. 1987). 
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registered headquarters in the 1870s. This figure fell to 35 per cent by the 1930s. Investor 
proximity to firms’ headquarters may be seen as an attempt to overcome informational 
asymmetries. Given that this development took place in an era with admittedly weak legal 
protection of small investors, it raises concerns about the historical validity of the so-called 
‘law matters’ argument. 
Our results show that there was a significant reduction in the effect of local bias over 
time. One of the reasons for this was the different patterns of local preference between 
investors who lived in London and investors resident in the rest of the UK. Local bias for 
Londoners remained strong and stable over the period (partly due to their preference for 
empire and to a lesser extent for foreign securities) whilst local preference for non-Londoners 
gradually declined. In fact, our calculations suggest that local bias gradually became a 
London bias. The same local bias can also be seen in relation to investor distance from the 
nearest stock exchange on which the security was listed. The great majority of Londoners in 
the sample invested only in LSE-listed securities. In addition, we find that local concentration 
of investment was generally higher than local concentration of investors; the majority of local 
investment came from wealthy investors. It seems that the latter were more sensitive to 
informational asymmetries. 
 The findings of this study offer evidence in favour of a particular interpretation of 
local investment preference: investor proximity to firms can be explained by relationships of 
trust developed between investors and the directors of the firms in which they invested. These 
informal trust networks, as already suggested by Franks et al., Mayer, and Campbell and 
Turner,98 probably served as further protection to minority investors, thereby contributing to 
the successful development of financial markets. On average, investors showed preference 
                                                          
98 Franks et al., ‘Ownership’; Mayer, ’Trust in financial markets’; Campbell and Turner, ‘Corporate 
governance’. 
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for locally headquartered shares and related informal trust networks with directors as a means 
of dealing with informational asymmetries. 
We find that the number of directors is positively related to local bias, in particular for 
holders of ordinary shares, indicating that a large board size could support larger networks of 
local investors in riskier ordinary shares. Directors with prestigious titles have an even 
stronger effect on local bias. We also find that older firms are associated with a stronger local 
bias effect for the top 25 per cent of investors with respect to the value of their holdings. 
Given the stickiness of shareholdings over time, it is likely that older firms were carrying 
with them larger local trust networks of wealthy investors with large stakes in the firms. 
These investors were more sensitive to informational asymmetries. Investors were also more 
sensitive to the risk of notionally safe investments (debentures) and local bias was more 
likely to decline with the increase in the number of cross listings of a security. 
 In addition to the above, we offer evidence that high entry costs to the market (high 
nominal value of the security) and a large investment holding were both motives for investors 
to stay close to the stock market the security was listed. Our findings also show that (for large 
firms) local investment bias was associated with higher director corporate control. In other 
words, when directors’ shareholdings and voting rights were important (allowing them to 
enjoy private benefits of control), there was a higher likelihood of local trust networks around 
these firms. In other words, the geographical dispersion of investment was positively related 
to the divorce between corporate ownership and control. 
 The paper describes local investment bias and offers possible historical explanations 
of it. It also exposes the weaknesses of the ‘law matters’ thesis in the interpretation of the UK 
financial developments.99 Future discussions on the history of corporate finance, financial 
                                                          
99 This is in line with current research. See section I above and also Musacchio and Turner, Does the law, for a 
comprehensive summary on the critiques of the ‘law matters’ argument. 
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development and the related growing ‘democratization’ of shareholdings should take the 
pattern of local bias into consideration as an important aspect of individual investor 
behaviour. The current study invites further research on local investment bias. In particular, it 
opens up two general research agendas. If local bias was strong in the era under investigation, 
how did it influence managerial decisions and strategies? At the same time, what are the 
consequences of local bias on the overall performance of UK corporations? Financial 
development in relation to minority shareholders is an important but generally 
underestimated theme in the financial history. 
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Table 1 Sample summary: investor characteristics 
 
panel (a) 
 
a Stock Exchange data taken from Morgan and Thomas, Stock Exchange, app. V, pp. 282-3. 
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Panel (b). Geographical distribution of investors and comparison with relevant estimations by 
Ellinger and Carter (1949) based on 1941 registers 
 
Notes: The Ellinger and Carter sample may include companies registered in Scotland. This might lead 
to more investors in Scotland in their sample relative to our sample which includes only companies 
registered in England or Wales. 
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Table 2 Distance between investors’ residences and companies’ headquarters in km. 
 
 
 
Notes: Foreign firms, as opposed to empire firms, are non-domestic firms that did not belong to the 
British Commonwealth. We divide our sample securities into three types: ordinary, preferred and 
debentures. We also divide into four categories of listing: (i) Public and listed, where the security may 
be a listed ordinary share, but could also be a listed preference share or debenture where the ordinary 
shares are also listed; (ii) Private and listed, where the security is listed but the ordinary shares of the 
firm are not listed; (iii) Private and unlisted, where neither the security in question nor the ordinary 
shares (if different) are listed; (iv) Public and unlisted, where the ordinary shares are listed but the 
security in question is not listed. This category has only 11 observations and so is excluded from the 
analysis. 
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Table 3 Distribution of investors by county of firm's headquarters 
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Table 4 
Percentage of investors living within 25km of companies’ registered headquarters per decade 
 
Panel (a) 
 
 
 
Panel (b) 
 
Notes: see notes of Table 2. 
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Table 5 Geographical breakdown of local bias per decade: % of investors living within 25km 
of companies’ registered headquarters (HQ). 
 
 
 
Notes: Our definition of London is based on census records in order to reflect increasing urbanisation 
over study period. Before 1900, London has been defined as the administrative county of London. 
After 1900, London includes all urban areas wholly or partly within a 10-mile circle from Charing 
Cross. 
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Table 6 Percentage of investors living within 25km of the nearest stock exchange on which 
the security is listed per decade. 
 
 
 
Notes: see notes of Table 2. 
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Table 7 Percentage of investors holding a LSE listed security per decade. 
 
 
 
Notes: see notes in Table 5. 
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Table 8 Geographical distribution of investment (panel a) and behaviour of the top 25% of 
investors in terms of the value of their holdings (panel b) 
 
Panel (a) 
 
 
 
Panel (b) 
 
Notes: See notes of Table 2. 
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Table 9 Determinants of local bias in relation to firm HQs: Logit regression results for the 
break with local bias. 
 
45 
 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in the brackets; standard errors have been corrected using the robust 
covariance matrix to allow for clustering at the share record level. In the above regressions the 
number of clusters varies between 198 and 74. The robustness of the above results has been checked 
using a nonparametric block bootstrap. * significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% 
level; *** significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 10 Local bias and directors’ board control. Regression results for the break with local 
bias. 
 
Notes: Bias corrected clustered standard errors in the brackets because in the above models clusters 
are ‘few’. The robustness of the results has also been checked in comparison with the wild bootstrap-t 
procedure and the cluster adjusted t-statistics which are also suggested in similar cases of few clusters. 
* Significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions for regressions 
 
Notes: IMM= Investor’s Monthly Manual, SEOI= Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. Before 1900, 
London includes the administrative county of London, while after 1900, all urban areas wholly or 
partly within a 10-mile circle from Charing Cross. These definitions are based on census records in 
order to reflect increasing urbanisation over study period.  
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On-line Table 1 Sample summary: company characteristics 
 
Panel (a) 
 
 
 
Panel (b) 
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Panel (c) 
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On-line Table 2 Development of cross listings per security type and decade (each cell reports 
the number of different securities). 
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On-line Table 3 Local preference in relation to the nearest stock exchange (from investor 
residence) on which the security was listed. Logit regression results for the break with local 
bias. 
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Notes: Clustered standard errors in the brackets; standard errors have been corrected using the robust 
covariance matrix to allow for clustering at the share record level. In the above regressions the 
number of clusters varies between 94 and 71. The robustness of the above results has also been 
checked using a nonparametric block bootstrap. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% 
level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
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On-line Table 4 Regressions at the firm level 
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On-line Table 5 Details of sample of regressions of Table 10 
 
 
